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strong (Ezek. 34.3-4, 15-16, 23-24). Throughout the ancient
Near East, justice was a royal function. Thus God, in the context
of the divine attribute of justice, could be addressed as a king.

CREATIVE REFORM THROUGH
POLITICS

THE IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNMENT
In the Bible the government, more than any other human agency,
is given responsibility for justice. The first task of government is
to ensure the basic rights of living in community. In this way love
promotes the good of every person.
God has granted specific powers to individuals and institutions
within society, which serve as instruments of God's sovereignty for
the benefit of human life and as barriers against tyranny, chaos,
and disorder.' One of these agents of power to which special authority is given is the government. Power created by God for good
is perverted by the selfishness of individuals and groups that struggle for power over one another; in this context the state is authorized by God to "bear the sword" (Rom. 13.4).Force may be used
to protect the innocent and punish those who prey upon them.
Likewise, it is God's instrument for the maintenance of order2 and
the securing of justice in society (Rom. 13; 1 Pet. 2).
The ruler is the servant of God for the good of the people
(Rom. 13.4).The content of this good (to agathon) needs to be
understood in light of the Hellenistic Jewish understanding of the
ruler as father and shepherd of the people and the Old Testament
view of the king as the one who feeds the people in justice by
seeking the lost, bringing back the strayed, binding up the crippled, strengthening the weak, and watching over the fat and

Mighty King, lover of justice, thou hast established equity, thou
has executed justice and righteousness to Jacob. (Ps. 99.4, RSV)

The ideal earthly ruler is characterized as one who carries out justice and in particular defends the cause of the oppressed (Ps. 72.14). Even pagan monarchs are commanded to exercise such justice
(Dan. 4.27).The state, when it is obedient to God, advances the
welfare of its citizens through laws which contribute to "freedom
and b r ~ t h e r h o o d " ; ~
if the state is disobedient, it voids its Godgiven responsibility and threatens the welfare of its citizens. Attention to the activity of government thus follows from Christian concern for welfare and j ~ s t i c e .Calvin
~
reflected the biblical perspective when he taught that civil rulers should "exhibit a kind of
image of the Divine Providence, guardianship, goodness, benevolence, and justice. "
The far-reaching institutionalized benevolence characteristic of
biblical justice, with its connection to the ruler, stands in contrast
to a historical theme in American political thought in which the
power of the state figures primarily a threat to freedom. Accordingly, some would restrict the activities of the state to maintaining
security of the borders and to such limited functions as the enforcement of contracts and protection against physical violence, theft,
and fraud. Christian realism about the tendency toward evil in
individuals and in groups will question the practicability of leaving
significant areas of social relations without a higher authority.
Biblical thought is quite aware of oppressive forces against which
the government must act. In an industrial society such forces appear in groups holding concentrated economic and social power
and in environmental factors such as disease and hunger. Here justice often requires an expanded role for the state. Objections to
civil rights legislation on grounds of "states' rights," or objections
to taxation for support of basic social programs, bring to mind
Bishop Francis McConnell's observation about "the absurdity of

'

194

PATHS T O JUSTICE

raising small problems of coercion when the necessity of providing
against a more general coercion is upon us."6
Although the state continues as servant of God, it b e l m to
_the fallen order of society., Unjust laws and corruption in government participate in the reality of social evil. The government,
like
other spheres of social life, is the scene of the struggle between the
fallen worldly powers and the authority of God for the control of
t h e human community. Two value systems are in conflict. W e are
to "battle for God's intention" over the powers and "against their
corruption."' This charge has a political dimension. W e either
passively acquiesce in the activity of the government, even though
that activity is contrary to God's will, or we refuse political subjection to the powers by struggling for justice "in the gate," as the
Scriptures command (Amos 5.15; cf. Zech. 8.16).
The political task receives a new dynamic with the Reign of
God breaking into history. The new social order that God is creating intermingles with and acts upon and against the old order,
which it will someday replace. Such a theological motif enabled
the Puritans to become the first group in history to understand
that one could intentionally and organizationally make changes in
one's community.8 The Puritans combined their passion for the
sovereignty of God over all of life with the conviction that the
fruits of conversion were relevant to the reconstruction of the social
order. Against the traditional conservative view that intentional
changes interfere with the natural order of things, the Puritans
perceived history as a degeneration, arrested only by the intervention of God. Historical precedent does not prevent required
change; Scripture and reason are sufficient. God, not history, i?
sovereign. Consequently, Thomas Case could proclaim, "Reform
the university . . . reform the cities . . . the countries . . . the
ordinances . . . the worship of God. . . . Every plant that my
heavenly Father hath not planted shall be rooted up."9
Some contemporary Christians allow the necessity of the government's authority, yet argue that they cannot be involved in that
process because the Christian is under a higher ethical standard
with which the coercive role of the state is incompatible. For some,
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the basic text excluding Christian participation in politics is Mark
10.42-43 (Matt. 20.2S261Luke 2 2 . 2 S 2 6 ) :
You know that those who are supposed to rule over the Gentiles
lord it over them, and their great men exercise authority over
them. But it shall not be so among you; but whoever would be
great among you must be your servant. (RSV)

O n e interpretation of this text can be that there is something basic
to the Christian ethic which is contrary to the meaning of the
state, and that the purpose of the state is to lord it over others, to
tyrannize.
Jesus refers his teaching in this passage to relationships among
the disciples ("among you," repeated twice). The things here observed of secular government are not to characterize the voluntary
Christian community. While Jesus does not suggest the application of this teaching to the conduct of the state, the standard for
the C h ~ k t i a ncommunity will create a critical awareness in evaluating analogous functions in the political community.
But what is actually said about the state? T h e rendering "lord
i t over" is a misinterpretation. The Greek term (katakyrietlein) is
not an intensive usage; it carries no suggestion of arrogance or
oppression but simply means "to rule over, to be lord over."'0 It
is not true that the passage equates political coercion with tyranny
or the abuse of power. Jesus is referring to the fact that there is a
hierarchy of authority in the state which is not to be repeated
within the Christian community.
As i t appears in Luke, this saying has an added point: "Their
authorities are called 'benefactors' " (Luke 22.25). The term benefactor (etlergetis) was an honorific title given in gratitude to a human
or divine benefactor. It was a sought-after title of very high status.
A grateful recipient of benefaction who bestowed this title acknowledged his or her inferior position by so doing. The term
belongs to a status system which, though highly developed in the
Greek and Roman world, is nonetheless not an essential or universal aspect of the state. This extension of status went so far that
such terms as benefactor served as central expressions of the "bene-
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factor cult," through which a community honored its human benefactors with sacrifices and other religious honors otherwise reserved for divine benefactors."
It is noteworthy that the
designation which in the Lukan account is associated with the fact
of rule connotes status, rather than use of force. In the Christian
community there must not be such distinctions of rank.
The contexts supplied for this saying of Jesus by the Gospels
support the contention that the teaching primarily concerns status,
rather than authority. In the Markan tradition, the context is the
request of James and John to receive positions of highest honor in
Christ's coming rule (Mark 10.35-41/Matt. 20.20-24). The saying refers specifically to the one who desires to be great (nzegas) or
both terms of rank and dignity (Mark 10.43-441Matt.
first (P~it'ot"),
20.26-27).12 The desire for status is condemned.
The Lukan account places this saying at a later point in the
ministry of Jesus. The context is simply a dispute among the disciples about who would be the greatest (megas, Luke 22.24). They
are told that the ruler or leader (ho higournenos) will appear as the
servant (Luke 22.26); the function of authority exists in the community, but carries with it no superiority in status.
In both these accounts, Jesus alludes to the rulers of the Gentiles in order to condemn not the power of authority as such, but
mther t
of seeking to be elevated above others. It is not
the fact of rule that is proscribed,
thority. The function of authority is an acceptable inequality insofar as it is of service to everyone, but it does not carry any ;mplication of superior dignity or worth.
These passages, when applied by analogy to the political commu nit^ will not prevent the Christian from participating in the
decision-m_akingprocesses of government. They should, however,
sensitize_-oneto the temptations of political power for personal
p d u m d ~ ~ ~ e ryl. ~ r l t
The other means to justice-evangelism, the Christian community, strategic noncooperation, and even revolution-are
completed by legislation. Political reform is a normal path to social
change; only in the breakdown of this process must recourse be
-

-

-
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had to the use of nonviolent coercion or, most exceptionally, to
justified armed revolution.

THE LIMITS O F POLITICS
Many who at first appear particularly hostile to the legislation of
social change are, upon further examination, seen to oppose not
political reform itself but, one, an excessive dependence upon rer two, the use of excessive power in reform.
W i t respect to the first concern, they are rightly critical of
such heavy reliance upon political and economic means to deal
with social evil that political action becomes the principal thrust
of the church in society. While seeking external controls to resolve
. .
s o c ~ agmbkms,we-m-a~come
l
to ne?of C o f n
,mission. Qeatjye reform must be onlv one in a sDectrum of means
to iustiqe.
Not only is a preoccupation with reforming the legal structure
of society unfaithful to the full responsibility of Christian life and
mission, but as a consequence it also fails to nurture the vital forces
that can make genuine reform a historical reality. In a democratic
society the institutions of government can improve but little on
the general morality and values of the community at large.13 The
effectiveness of a law depends in large part upon the ability of
voluntary associations, such as religious and educational institutions, to lead and mold public opinion.14 The person in office,
much of whose energy is spent on the maintenance of society and
on staying in office, needs the creative support of those out of
government, who are free from these obligations. l 5 The Christian
drive for social righteousness needs to be present in both spheres.
The legislative and judicial processes promoting social justice,
though vitally important, are only the tip of the iceberg. A just
and humane society can exist only because its people possess such
qualities as self-respect and self-acceptance, tolerance, mutual respect, unselfishness, honesty, the sense of right and duty, the desire for equal treatment, and fidelity to law. Law itself is more

x
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than a system of regulations; it embodies many of these same qualities, which constitute the indispensable foundation of every legal
order. It is important that the content of legal regulations encourage
the growth of these values. The creation of these values, however,
must come about through associations distinct from the state; the
formation of these values should not, and indeed cannot, be subject
to governmental control. Inattention to these ethical, even religious, dimensions of order can deprive justice of its capacity to
survive. Politics alone will not suffice to elicit or instill such values. Evangelism and Christian community do contribute to the
process, even when only indirectly through a leavening effect in
society. l 6
The abuse of power in reform movements has also been rightly
protested. Although the advance of justice requires support from
political authority, Christians must always be mindful that, as
Reinhold Niebuhr warned, power easily becomes the tool of the
will-to-power, the sinful need to have power over others. The very
corruptions which make the use of power necessary for achieving
justice may infect the reformers themselves.
It is essential, in the attempt to combat evil and to advance
righteousness by means of legislation, to distinguish between those
actions which impose necessary restrictions on others in order to
further the welfare of the neighbor, and those actions which stem
from a will-to-power and the desire to dominate others. The goal
must not be to gain power for oneself in the interest of attaining
one's own objectives, but rather to empower others.17
Christian efforts for just legislation will find expression in
democratic processes rather than in change dictated from above,
which circumvents participation from below. Social processes that
involve each person in the decisions which personally affect him
or her have a dual theological basis: on the one hand, the impulse
of love, which demands respect for every person, and on the other,
the imperative to oppose the abuse that arises from the unchecked
power of one person over another, which is one symptom of human
depravity. Participatory democracy can be focused upon a centralized or a decentralized administration, depending upon the particular social and political situation. In recent cases of civil rights
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law it has been centralized administration which has most often
imdlemented justice and freedom. Centralization and decentralization do not involve basic principles of justice, however, but are
variables to be used to promote social good, particularly for disadvantaged minorities.
Should one attempt to coerce adherence to Christian values?
One writer sees little difference between forcing all citizens to be
"their brothers' keepers" and the use of taxes to support preaching.'' There are three things to be considered: the commands of
Scripture, the criteria for Christian political decision-making, and
the types of duties that are subject to legislation.
The Christian must be concerned about legislating the duties
arising from responsibility for members of the community because
Scripture teaches that the care of the needy is a matter of justice
and therefore an obligation upon the whole.
The Christian must be guided by Christian values and duties
in his or her participation in politics. What other set of values
could guide a Christian? "Which morality" is what much of politics is about; behind the dispute in political issues lies disagreement about ethical values.'g Christians with a sense of the sovereignty of God should not be reticent about the social necessity for
their standard of justice. "Nobody in all the world is more qualified for political action than the child of God."20
But as we have indicated, work for justice is to be carried out
through democratic processes. It is not a matter of the imposition
of a minority's will (with the attendant necessity of endless restraints). If Christian ideals are to be embodied in the regulations
of a secular society like the United States, the process will need
support from non-Christians. Christian reform is advanced by the
fact that, while we do not live in a Christian society, neither do
we live in a pagan society without any Christian heritage. Ours is
a semi-Christian society, which has been influenced by past and
present leavening of Christian influence, and in which Judeo-Christian social values are often advanced with more vigor by nonbelievers than by many believers. But whether one is with the
majority or not, one can work democratically only from one's own
social outlook. A pluralistic society would become sterile if all tra-
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ditions were reduced to the least common denominator. How then
does one deal with a question such as racism or slavery? Could one
countenance a refusal to work for laws which would reflect the
Christian ideal in such a situation? Would one back off from sanctions on slave masters in the name offreedom from coercion?
Yet the question of freedom is relevant because not all matters
of right are appropriate for legislation. Legislation deals with matters of justice; it deals with matters which substantially involve
rights. Legislation is also appropriate in order to regulate actions
which may cause harm to individuals or to institutions; it does not
pertain to private matters that do not either interfere with the
well-being of another or diminish the well-being of the community
as a whole.
Legislation is also not appropriately used to give special advantage to a private group, such as a church. Merely cultic values
must not be imposed. Such coercion was part of the defect of the
Constantinianism of the medieval Corpus Christianum, in which the
state and the church formed one whole, each using the other for
its own ends.2' Payment of preachers' salaries by the state would
be an obvious act of Constantinianism; there is a long democratic
tradition which would distinguish that practice from legislating
community responsibilities for the needy.

CREATIVE O R COOPTABLE REFORM
The kind of reform rightly condemned by many who are searching
for action to deal with the basic problems of a society is a cooptable
type of reform; slight improvements are proposed to deal with
what are in fact the fundamental problems of the society.22 The
changes which are sought and allowed are only those compatible
with the preservation of the present social and economic system.
The needs of the system determine which actions are rational, practical, and possible.23 The assumption is that the system is fundamentally sound.24 The situation of the people may be improved,
but no real alternatives to the present power relationships are considered.
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Constantinianism lends itself to such palliative reform through
the mutual approval and support of church and state, in its old
form, or in the current secular version, between the church and
"the establishment." In this relationship the church cannot preach
judgment on the selfish purposes at the heart of society without
condemning its own role in that society. The ethics taught are
those which are feasible within the limits of the acceptance of the
established society . 2 5
The short-term cooptable perspective has characterized some of
the reform movements which have received the most attention in
our century. Many struggles to correct disproportionate economic
power have resulted in the appointment of independent regulating
commissions, to cite a leading example. The hope of many was
that a commission would serve as an effective watchdog to protect
the public interest from the industry regulated. Yet the regulating
commissions become the captive of the industry to be regulated.
In the Progressive reforms of the period 1900-19 16 the very form
of the regulating legislation was usually proposed by the industry
involved.26 The typical regulating commission goes through a life
cycle of increasing control by the industry. As public and congressional attention is withdrawn after the creation of the commission,
the agency drops its police role and begins to play more the role
of a manager of an industry. It is accepted and supported as an
essential part of the industry, providing stability and predictability. The attitude toward the public interest becomes one of passivity and cold neutrality. The close relations with the industry and
the narrow definition of its activities hamper the commission from
even discerning the public interest.27
But the discouraging history of regulating commissions was to
be expected from the nature of the reforms. Gabriel Kolko argues
that the reforms of the Progressive period were prototypical of the
regulating reforms which followed. They were founded on the assumption of the soundness of the basic patterns of property relationships in the American economy. No serious alternatives to the
actual power in the hands of economic elites were proposed for
organizing society.2HWhat has been sought is not a reordering of
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economic relationships but the elimination of flagrant abuses.29
When the commissions dealt with the abuses and then became
spokespersons for the industry, they were only fulfilling their
original purpose of aiding the continuation of the established system of business, minus the practices that exposed it to serious
public c r i t i ~ i s m . ~Such
'
reformers, operating in the "genteel tradition of middle-class reform" and lacking a deep conviction of the
reality of economic evil, hope to modify basic economic institutions by "tinkering with the machinery of government."3'
Similar observations need to be made about the palliative programs of the 1960s, disappointment with which has led to a "neoconservative" movement of reaction to governmental reform. As
Michael Harrington has argued, despite the claims by the government and the fears of the conservatives, the Great Society programs
never included a pervasive governmental intrusion into the private
sphere. Nor was there a massive trend toward equality in the
1960s. The programs were oversold and ~ n d e r f i n a n c e d .Not
~~
their prodigality, but their lack of a radical innovative character
has contributed to the developing urban struggle between the
have-nots and the have-littles. It is not governmental generosity
which has created the incentive for recipients of welfare programs
to remain d e ~ e n d e n t .but the timiditv of government and the failure of a full-employment
One can say of the whole climate of protest in the 1960s that the focus was upon a more open
society in policy formulation and social movement with only peripheral concern to economic institutions and economic power.3"
But there is another type of reform. It is built on the premise
that many social changes, even revolutionary changes, come only
through a cumulative series of partial steps.35 Here the reformer's
goals are dissonant with the current social structures, but he or she
recognizes that these goals cannot be achieved all at once. One
accepts concrete solutions to specific problems but only on premises that question the assumptions of the present order and only as
leading in the general direction of a new order. The Christian reformer first of all has a vision of the new order of the Reign of
God but also realizes that the Reign will be only partially realiz-
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able in history. The Christian also operates with a vision of a community in history which is not the Reign of God but which is
more proximate to the Reign than is the present society. Specific
reforms are advanced as they reflect the ultimate and the historical
vision.
Creative reforms are addressed particularly to those changes
which modify power relationships, set forth a new order of priorities, and provide new models of life and culture." They are
changes which limit the power of those currently holding disproportionate power, which make the weak more aware of their human rights, and which grant the poor and members of the working
class (both in capitalism and in state socialism) more control over
their lives.
In creative reform the limits of what is possible are redefined
so as not to reflect the needs, criteria, and rationales of the present
way of doing things but rather what should be made possible in
terms of human needs. 37
But what should be possible often only becomes reality piecemeal. I have found John Yoder's strategy in an Anabaptist perspective helpful for models of Christian political reform which reflect more direct participation of Christians in the political process.
There is a disparity between the demands of God and what is politically. possible, between a Christian ethic dependent upon regeneration and its political expression, particularly in a secular state.
Thus what is sought through creative reform cannot be the elimination of all evil or even the immediate structuring of a new social
order. Rather the political strategy is to seek changes toward what
should be made possible by concentrating upon identifiable concrete problems of justice which are capable of being dealt with at
present. The greatest possible step toward the desired restructuring
of society is what is always required for creative r e f ~ r m . ~ "
W e have no grounds for great optimism about the possibility
of far-reaching political reform. It is difficult to see the possibility
of wholesale radical structural changes. Yet the "neoconservative"
counsel of diminished ~ u b l i cintervention in our economic and so. . . .
sia1 problems is not the answer, for such & I S a r n ~ l c ~nnr
,
-
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s in the reformist posture. There are no
easy answers but "there are some solutions to some of our problems." 3"mall
victories are important, especially as they advance
toward what should be possible. O n e must evaluate political
change in the light
of the difficulty of creating change at any level
of human behavior. In considering political possibilities, we should
remember that the security possessed by individuals and major segments of our society rides the crest of past political struggles to
distribute power and the fruits of technology.
The short-sighted perspective on reform, which does not confront the gravity of the problems of the current system, leads to
short-run efforts. Some of the failures of reform have been due to
a lack of vigilance on the part of the reformers. This failure, for
example, has been damaging in the history of the regulatory commissions, where once regulation is legislated the reformers takq
what
they view as an earned rest and fail to provide sustained vig-ilance over the administration of the regulation.40 In the time of
Lincoln Steffens Philadelphia was regarded as the worst-governed
city in the country, but it reflected a condition which followed
reform: "Reform with us is usually revolt, not government, and is
soon over."41 Bishop Francis J . McConnell once said, "The trouble
is not that we don't get mad but that we don't stay mad."42
"Never settle for winning,"
warns Dieter Hessel. 43 More should
be expected from those with the Christian perspective of human
society and the Christian grounds for concern.

morality extends to matters of justice and rights, hold legislation
to be futile in such matters as well. It is to this attitude that we
would respond.
There are two aspects to morality. One aspect is subjectiveour dispositions, intentions, even perceptions; it would appear difficult to legislate subjective morality. But the other aspect of morality is objective-ur
external behavior. Biblical ethics gives considerable space to regulating external actions, and social policy is
more concerned with objective behavior. For social policy, tangible
justice is more important than intangible love (although the highest standard is the presence and interconnection of both). Harvey
Cox wrote several years ago:
The recent civil rights revolution in America has proved at least
one thing: Negroes are not so much interested in winning whites
to a less prejudiced attitude as they are in preventing them from
enforcing the prejudice they do have. The Negro revolt is not
aimed at winning friends but at winning freedom, not interpersonal warmth but institutional justice. . . . The inmates of the
urban concentration camp do not long for fraternization with the
guards; what they want is the abolition of the prison; not improved relations with the captors but "release from ~ a p t i v i t ~ . " ~ "

YOU CAN'T LEGISLATE MORALITY?
O u r view of human nature and of history makes us aware that we
cannot guarantee or assume sufficient personal morality to control
injustice in society. W h a t then are we to do? One answer is enforceable law. Can morality be achieved through the legal process?
A frequently heard answer is the slogan, "You can't legislate morality." This phrase is applied by many to matters of private activity or consumption that do not harm the well-being of others: in
such cases legislation is indeed futile. Others, however, aware that
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External actions can be legally controlled and motivated 45 even
though inner motivations cannot. The slogan "YOU can't legislate
morality" is often used to offer a rationale for government to do
nothing; but governments always regulate public behavior, and the
great majority of our laws are attempts to control human behavi ~ r . ~ ~
Law, however, also has an impact upon the subjective aspects
of morality. Law has an educative factor. It communicates a standard of right which can function through the superego. Law can
legitimate morality. Law also has a conditioning factor. Virtues are
habits, and habits are formed by doing similar acts over a period
of time. The habits that are formed from youth do make a differcncc.
by encouraging the desired
-- --- --- O n e can promote public behavior
~ d u e legally.
s
&

A
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This is confirmed by what happens in the city states. For the
lawmakers make the citizens do good by forming good habits in
them and certainly this is the will of every lawmaker; and those
who do not will miss the mark. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
1lO3b. 2 4 )
This viewpoint taken without qualification runs the risk of overreliance upon law (cf. pp. 197-98), but i t is generally correct.
O n e cannot in this way make new creatures, but one can affect
character in ways that are socially perceptible. One can make a
better society even if not a wholly well society.
Coerced actions have an impact even upon basic values, perceptions, and attitudes. A case in point is the effects of the creative
civil rights legislation and judicial decisions in recent United
States history. Surveys at the University of Alabama from the time
of its forced desegregation in 1963 until 1969 showed an increasing acceptance of blacks. There was a growing willingness to include blacks with whites in activities over which the general society was in conflict, such as worship and travel. O n campus there
was less reluctance to include blacks in activities involving close
relationships with whites. Traits traditionally associated with
blacks were viewed more positively and stereotypes were falling.
There was growing support of blacks having political and economic
equality with whites. The student majority in 1963 accepted the
"separate but equal" doctrine. The student majority in 1969 approved desegregation. In 1969 the majority had not yet accepted
social desegregation (rooming with blacks, double-dating, mixed
dating), but there were strong trends in that direction.47
Robert Coles studied the attitudes of Southern white teachers
in desegregated schools. Many found that their sentiments about
desegregation were changed by the experience of having to teach
black children. One said,
At first he was a Negro, then he became just another pupil. I'm
not against him, though I still feel loyal to the way we've always
lived down here. It's two different problems, you know.48
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There are still tensions, but feelings are being conditioned even by
compulsory experiences. The new attitudes are becoming part of
the way of life to which people later will come to feel some loyalty.
The impact of civil rights legislation upon a locality has been
carefully examined in a model political essay by Frederick W i r t . It
is an interesting, well-written work based on impeccable research
in Panola County, Mississippi. National law and national law enforcement were instruments of change in voter registration,
schools, and economic rights. There is no evidence that there
would have been significant change without such enforcement. In
1960 two-thirds of the black population earned less than $2,000.
Only one black could vote. Except as private household workers,
blacks earned less than whites in every occupation. Expenditure for
black pupils was one-half to one-third of that for white pupils;
almost two-thirds of the blacks received no more than six years of
education. That law enforcement was effective was due in a large
part to the role played by the Justice Department in the 1960s in
litigation, overcoming the breakdown in the adversary system, in
which the white lawyer out-weighed his black opponent in power
and status and the judge was connected with the interests of the
whites. In 1967, 3 , 5 0 0 blacks (50 percent of those eligible) were
registered to vote. Their votes were being sought by white candidates. There were gravelled roads to black homes for the first time
in memory. The local press had more and better coverage of the
black community. Official violence had been curbed. There was
little impact in the area of economic rights, e . g . , employment
needs. The legislation was palliative here; the federal programs met
symptoms and did not deal with the roots of the problem. While
perception of blacks had changed little, behavior patterns had,
which made it possible that the change in perception would follow. 4 9
Such legislation and enforcement represented creative reform.
T h e increase in the liberty of blacks led to an alteration in their
perception of themselves and the possibilities in their community.
The reform created new possibilities of change. A vote and better
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schools can open out the old self-defeating perspective to a new
vision of life's potential. There follows a new belief in one's worth
as an i n d i ~ i d u a l . ' ~
The direct path to this achievement of partial justice was creative reform through politics. This path was not the only one,
however. In the distant background was the teaching of the Christian church on the meaning of the life of everyone for whom Christ
died. Behind the civil rights legislation was the powerful witness
of those who had laid down their bodies and even their lives in
noncooperation with evil. And behind those witnesses were communities which sustained them.
These paths came together to provide a road to justice. It is a
road which can most easily be followed by those who at the beginning meet One who gives them in place of oppression a yoke that
is easy and a burden that is light.
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